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Unlawful attacks, namely, attacks against civilian population and 
civilian objects and disproportionate attacks, have characterized recent 
and on-going armed conflicts around the world, including those taking 
place in the Middle East and Africa. International humanitarian law 
prohibits them. However, their prosecution is difficult as the case-law of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia evidences. 
In applying its Statute, the Elements of Crimes text and emerging 
practice, the International Criminal Court is expected to face similar 
challenges in ongoing and future cases. Underlying questions are why 
the prosecution of unlawful attacks before international criminal 
tribunals is challenging and how to handle it. Two reasons arguably 
explain this. First, there are problems relating to notions such as 
“civilian,” “civilian object” and “proportionality”. Second, there are 
practical problems including access to evidence, selection of modes of 
criminal liability, and prosecutorial discretion. How the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has handled this and how 
the International Criminal Court may proceed are examined.           
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I. Introduction 
Unlawful attacks, namely attacks against civilians, civilian 
populations, or civilian objects and disproportionate attacks, are 
prohibited in treaty and customary international humanitarian law (IHL).1 
However, as this article argues, the prosecution of unlawful attacks as 
war crimes has proven to be difficult at international criminal tribunals. 
As discussed throughout the present article, this is evidenced by the case 
law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY). Based on the ICTY experience, this article also argues that the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) is expected to face similar trouble in 
ongoing and future cases. Thus, the research questions that arise are why 
the prosecution of unlawful attacks before international criminal 
tribunals is particularly challenging and how to handle it. In addressing 
these research questions, this article seeks to demonstrate that there are 
two main reasons that underlie the obstacles to prosecution of unlawful 
attacks as war crimes. First, this article argues that there are problems 
relating to notions such as “civilian,” “civilian object,” and 
“proportionality,” originally contained in general prohibitory IHL rules 
but now used as underlying notions in prosecution of the respective war 
crimes.2 Second, there are problems of a more practical nature including 
access to evidence, determination of criminal liability modes suitable for 
prosecutorial strategy, and discretion of prosecutors of international 
criminal tribunals to open investigations, bring charges, or both.3 It is 
herein analyzed how the ICTY has handled this and how the ICC under 
its Statute/Elements of Crimes text and its emerging case law can 
proceed.   
This article first discusses the prohibition and subsequent 
criminalization of unlawful attacks. Then, problems relating to the 
notions of “civilian” and “civilian object/military objective” in unlawful 
attacks as war crimes are examined. Later, this article discusses problems 
  
 1. See generally MARCO SASSÒLI & ANTOINE A. BOUVIER, HOW DOES LAW 
PROTECT IN WAR? 199–230 (2d ed. 2006); Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for 
the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 175, 198–200 (2005); see 
infra Section II (for detailed discussion and respective citations).  
 2. See infra Sections III, IV, and V (concerning the problems on IHL notions). 
 3. See infra Section VI. 
410 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 26.3  
relating to the principle of proportionality in unlawful attacks as war 
crimes. Then, practical problems relating to the prosecution of unlawful 
attacks as war crimes are identified and discussed. Finally, some 
conclusions are provided.             
II. Unlawful Attacks: From Prohibition to Criminalization 
IHL has traditionally been implemented via prevention although a 
posteriori judicial action is increasing.4 As to the conduct of hostilities, 
IHL is articulated at a high level of generality.5 In turn, international 
criminal law is punitive.6 As international criminal law addresses 
individual criminal responsibility, its provisions have to be very specific 
to satisfy the principle of legality.7 International criminal tribunals 
(including the ICTY and the ICC) refine, develop and adapt IHL 
prohibitions, including those against unlawful attacks, to criminal 
proceedings.8 Thus, it is herein necessary to present an overview of the 
prohibitions and crimes concerning unlawful attacks as follows.9  
The prohibition against attacking civilian population and civilians is 
contained in the Protocols Additional to the Four Geneva Conventions of 
1949 applicable to international and non-international armed conflicts 
respectively (AP I and AP II respectively) and is recognized as 
customary IHL.10 Although there is no similar explicit prohibition against 
  
 4. See SASSÒLI & BOUVIER, supra note 1, at 348–49. 
 5. See, e.g., FRITS KALSHOVEN, REFLECTIONS ON THE LAW OF WAR: 
COLLECTED ESSAYS 628 (2007). 
 6. See Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, International Criminal Law for 
Retributivists, 35 U. Pa. J. INT’L L. 969, 985, 1030 (2014); see generally Paola Gaeta, 
The Interplay Between the Geneva Conventions and International Criminal Law, in THE 
1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 737, 751–52 (Andrew Clapham et al. eds., 
2015). 
 7. Antonio Cassese, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 41–43 (2d ed. 2008). 
 8. See SASSÒLI & BOUVIER, supra note 1, at 322. 
 9. Attacks following Article 49 of the AP I are: “acts of violence against the 
adversary, whether in offence or in defence.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts art. 49, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]. 
 10. Id. arts. 48, 51(2); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts art. 13(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]; The Principle 
of Distinction Between Civilians and Combatants: Rule 1, ICRC, https://ihl-
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attacking civilian objects under AP II (unlike AP I),11 this prohibition is 
also applicable to non-international armed conflicts under customary 
IHL.12 The principle underlying these treaty and customary prohibitions 
is the principle of distinction according to which attacks must not be 
directed against civilians or civilian objects and which is recognized as 
one of the cardinal IHL principles.13 The prohibition against launching 
disproportionate attacks is included in AP I and is also considered 
applicable to non-international armed conflicts under customary IHL.14 
As for criminalization of those prohibitions, AP I considers attacks 
against civilian populations, individual civilians, and disproportionate 
attacks as grave breaches.15 This is a category of war crimes only 
applicable in international armed conflicts.16 Be that as it may, the war 
crimes of unlawful attacks in international and non-international armed 
conflicts are customary IHL.17  
The ICTY interpreted that “general principles and rules on the 
protection of victims of [non-international armed conflicts] and for 
breaching certain fundamental principles and rules regarding means and 
methods of combat in civil strife” are criminalized under customary 
law.18 The ICTY thus established that unlawful attacks as war crimes 
may be committed in non-international armed conflicts. The ICTY also 
  
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul (last visited Jan. 1, 2017) [hereinafter 
ICRC]. 
 11. AP I, supra note 9, art. 52(1). 
 12. ICRC, supra note 10, r. 2. 
 13. See, e.g., ICRC, supra note 10, r. 1, 7 (for customary IHL rules reflecting this 
principle); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226 ¶ 78 (July 8).  
 14. AP I, supra note 9, arts. 51(5)(b), 57; ICRC, supra note 10, r. 14.  
 15. AP I, supra note 9, art. 85(3)(a)–(b).  
 16. See SASSÒLI & BOUVIER, supra note 1, at 304; Gaeta, supra note 6, at 615, 
642–643.   
 17. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 576, 580, 591, 597, 599 (2005) (discussing 
international armed conflicts and non-international conflicts under customary IHL Rule 
156); see also id. at 581 (Although attacks against civilian objects are prohibited under 
AP I, they were not explicitly included as grave breaches in the AP I. In any event, they 
are considered war crimes under customary IHL.). 
 18. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 134 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Oct. 2, 1995).  
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understood that the non-exhaustive list of “violations of the laws or 
customs of war” contained in Article 3 of the ICTY Statute includes 
serious violations of conduct of hostilities as they meet some 
requirements set by the ICTY.19  
The ICC Statute, as complemented by the ICC Elements of Crimes 
text,20 criminalizes attacks against civilian population, individual 
civilians, and civilian objects as war crimes in international armed 
conflicts—Article 8(2)(b)(i), (ii)—and attacks against civilians in non-
international armed conflicts—Article 8(2)(e)(i).21 However, war crimes 
of attacks against civilian objects and disproportionate attacks in non-
international armed conflicts are out of the ICC’s jurisdiction.22 It should 
be mentioned that national criminal courts have prosecuted unlawful 
attacks: i) as war crimes implementing specific IHL treaty provisions, 
customary rules, or both into their national criminal laws;23 or ii) as 
  
 19. Id. ¶ 87; see also id. ¶ 94 (To be subject to prosecution pursuant to Article 3:  
“(i) the violation must constitute an infringement of a rule of 
[IHL]; (ii) the rule must be customary in nature or, if it belongs to 
treaty law, the required conditions must be met . . . ; (iii) the 
violation must be ‘serious’, . . . [i.e.,] it must constitute a breach 
of a rule protecting important values, and the breach must involve 
grave consequences for the victim . . . ; (iv) the violation of the 
rule must entail . . . individual criminal responsibility . . . .”). 
 20. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 1, 2002, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter ICC Statute]. 
 21. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(i) (“Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian 
population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities.”); id. 
art. 8(2)(b)(ii) (“Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects 
which are not military objectives.”); id. art. 8(2)(e)(i) (“Intentionally directing attacks 
against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part 
in hostilities.”). 
 22. See id. arts. 8(2)(b), (e).  
 23. In the cases against Đukić Novak, Karajić Suljo, and Gojko Kličkovíc, at the 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the accused were charged with war crimes against 
civilians referred to in Article 173(1) of the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina as 
inter alia: a) attack on civilian population and individual civilians; and b) “attack without 
selecting a target, by which civilian population is harmed.”; See Lejla Vujinovic, 
Correspondents’ Reports: Bosnia and Herzegovina, 11 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 
407, 419, 432–33 (2008).      
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domestic offences such as terrorism, murder, serious injuries or all 
three.24                 
III. Problems Relating to the Notion of “Civilian” in Unlawful 
Attacks as War Crimes 
In international armed conflicts, while Article 50.1 of the AP I defines 
civilian as “any person who does not belong to one of the categories of 
persons referred to [members of armed forces as detailed in Geneva 
Convention III and AP I],”25 civilian population, under Article 50.2 of 
the AP I, comprises “all persons who are civilians.”26 Under customary 
IHL, similar definitions also apply to non-international armed conflicts.27 
There is no category of quasi-combatant.28 In giving content to the notion 
of “civilians,” an important notion is “direct participation in hostilities,” 
which is defined by the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) in its interpretative guidance on direct participation in 
hostilities.29 Thus, direct participation consists of acts that must be 
objectively likely to inflict harm to either adversely affect the military 
operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or to inflict 
death, injury, or damage on persons or objects protected from direct 
attacks30 provided that there is direct causation between that harm and the 
  
 24. E.g., Court of First Instance of Peru: National Criminal Chamber Oct. 13, 
2006, Case No. 560-03, 72, 135–38, 240; Victor Polay Campos et al., Accumulated File 
01-93, Judgement, at 134-36 (Mar. 21, 2006) (in both cases the accused were found 
guilty of terrorism, murder and serious injuries with references to IHL in the context of 
the Peruvian non-international armed conflict).  
 25. AP I, supra note 9, art. 50(1). 
 26. Id. art. 50(2).  
 27. See ICRC, supra note 10, at r.5 (“Civilians are persons who are not members 
of the armed forces. The civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians.” 
This rule is applicable to international armed conflicts/non-international armed conflicts); 
Prosecutor v. Kordić, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 50, 97 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004). 
 28. SASSÒLI & Bouvier, supra note 1, at 204. 
 29. Nils Melzer, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT 
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, INT’L 
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS 46 (2009).  
 30. Id. at 47.  
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military operation.31 Those acts must be “specifically designed to directly 
cause the required threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict 
and to the detriment of another.”32  
In prosecuting cases where armed groups mingle with civilians, the 
question is how a commander or a foot soldier knows when civilians are 
directly participating in hostilities. In general, it depends on the context 
to conclude if someone is directly participating in hostilities. The ICTY 
has considered that a person shall not be attacked when, under the 
circumstances at the time, it was not reasonable for the attacker to 
believe or conclude that the potential target was a combatant.33 Such 
knowledge may be proved via the existence of information at the time of 
the attack.34 When there is no evidence, it would be sufficient to show 
that the commander should have known the civilian character of the 
population based on a known state of affairs or on common sense.35 
Control of an area by the attackers and their previous contact with 
persons who were subsequently attacked may lead to the inference that 
the attackers must have been aware of the civilian status of the victims as 
indicated in the so-called Goldstone Report on the Gaza Conflict.36 The 
loss of the civilian protection only lasts during the time when the civilian 
takes a direct part in hostilities,37 namely, an act that both causes harm 
against a party to the armed conflict and is connected to hostilities.38 
Examples of a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities include: 
voluntary human shields and delivery by a civilian truck driver of 
  
 31. Id. at 51; see also Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Judgement, ¶ 
178 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 17, 2008). 
 32. Melzer, supra note 29, at 58.  
 33. Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶ 50 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Carolin Wuerzner, Mission Impossible? Bringing Charges for the Crime 
of Attacking Civilians or Civilian Objects Before International Criminal Tribunals, 90 
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 907, 915 (2008). 
 36. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on 
the Gaza Conflict, ¶ 43, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 25, 2009).  
 37. AP I, supra note 9, art. 51(3), AP II, supra note 10, art. 13(3); ICRC, supra 
note 10, r.6; Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Judgement, ¶ 157 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004). 
 38. Melzer, supra note 29, at 46. 
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ammunition to an active firing position at the front line.39 In case of 
doubt, the civilian status is presumed.40  
However, those who become members of organized armed groups 
lose their protection against a direct attack during the duration of their 
membership as they assume a “continuous combatant function.”41 This 
concept departs from the notion of “direct participation in hostilities” and 
constitutes an alternative standard for targeting.42 It is indeed an 
exception to direct participation in hostilities since those members of 
armed groups considered as having “continuous combatant function” can 
be targeted not only when they directly participate in hostilities.43 
Accordingly, this article argues that the notion of “continuous 
combat[ant] function” seeks to address a remaining gap not covered by 
“direct participation in hostilities” and which consists of inequality in 
targetability between the state armed forces and the armed forces of a 
non-state party to the armed conflict. The notion of “continuous 
combat[ant] function” thus creates a greater expansion up to higher 
levels in the chain of command although it does not necessarily require 
command responsibility.44 In any event, as authors Sassoli, Bouvier, and 
Quintin point out, the difficult practical question is how state armed 
forces determine fighting membership when the individual in question 
commits no hostile acts.45 It is hence important for those who are 
regarded as having “continuous combat[ant] function” to declare that 
they put an end to this status or manifest so via conclusive behavior.46  
  
 39. Id. at 56–57. 
 40. AP I, supra note 9, art. 50(1); see also HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, 
supra note 17, at 24 (especially relevant information concerning non-international armed 
conflicts).  
 41. Melzer, supra note 29, at 73; see also Prosecutor v. Kordić, Case No. IT-95-
14/2-A, Judgement, ¶ 51 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004). 
 42. See Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: 
The Constitutive Elements, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 697, 704 (2010); Nils Melzer, 
Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four 
Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 831, 890 (2010). 
 43. See Schmitt, supra note 42, at 704; MELZER, supra note 29, at 890–92. 
 44. See MELZER, supra note 29, at 72. 
 45. See MARCO SASSÒLI ET AL., HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? 15 (3d ed. 
2011). 
 46. Melzer, supra note 29, at 72.  
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According to the ICTY, the existence of some military activities such 
as poorly armed or trained part time soldiers defending their villages 
would not deprive the population of its civilian character. This is correct 
because such character is not changed by the presence within the civilian 
population of some individuals entitled to combatant status or those 
actively participating in the hostilities.47 However, the ICTY went further 
by equating a weak defence with no defence at all.48 This finding may be 
questioned. The ICTY mistakenly equated two different scenarios, 
namely, i) a civilian population that is not taking direct part in hostilities 
and is undefended; and ii) a civilian population which, albeit its poor 
organization, is equipped and instructed to conduct a military defence 
and, thus, may be targeted as a military objective taking precautions in 
the attack.49  
The ICC in applying its Statute and Elements of Crimes determined 
that the crime of attacks against civilians consists of intentional attacks 
against civilians not having directly participated in hostilities, and may 
be established even if a military objective was also targeted, although 
attacks targeting military objectives that incidentally affected civilians 
fall short of this crime.50 
A major challenge to charges for attacks against civilians is to prove 
that the accused knew that the individuals attacked were civilians and 
that his attack was not based on the reasonable belief that one of the 
following exceptions to the protection of civilians applies:51 first, when 
  
 47. Prosecutor v. Simić, Case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgement, ¶ 42 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 17, 2003); AP I, supra note 9, art. 50(3).  
 48. See Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, ¶ 407 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000).  
 49. See HÉCTOR OLÁSOLO, UNLAWFUL ATTACKS IN COMBAT SITUATIONS: 
FROM THE ICTY’S CASE LAW TO THE ROME STATUTE 116–17 (2008); see also AP I, 
supra note 9, art. 57 (stating the precautions to be made in the case of attack); ICRC, 
supra note 10, r.15–21 (stating the precautions to be made in the case of attack regarding 
international armed conflicts/non-international armed conflicts). If civilians exert 
individual self-defence or defence of others, there is no belligerent nexus and, hence, this 
does not constitute direct participation in hostilities. MELZER, supra note 29, at 61. 
However, self-defence as an exception to the classification of certain conducts as direct 
participation in hostilities has to be construed very narrowly. See SASSÒLI ET AL., supra 
note 45, at 11.   
 50. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgement Pursuant to 
Article 74 of the Statute, ¶¶ 796-808 (Mar. 7, 2014).  
 51. See Wuerzner, supra note 35, at 912.   
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civilians abuse their rights; second, even if the object of the attack is a 
military objective, belligerents cannot avoid causing collateral damage.52   
As for mens rea, the prosecutor has to prove, according to the ICTY, 
that the offender “was aware or should have been aware of the civilian 
status of the persons attacked.”53 In case of doubt about the status of the 
attacked person, the person should be considered a civilian.54 The 
standard of proof is that a reasonable person in the circumstances could 
not have believed that the attacked individual was a combatant.55 
Concerning mens rea of the war crime of attacking civilians, there is an 
important difference between the ICTY case law and the ICC 
Statute/Elements of Crimes. Following the ICRC AP I Commentary,56 
the ICTY has broadly interpreted the expression “when committed 
willfully” contained in Article 85.3(a) of the AP I57 by including not only 
criminal intent, or dolus, but also recklessness.58 However, as interpreted 
by the ICC, the ICC Statute/Elements of Crimes raise the evidentiary 
threshold requiring intent.59 This option may be considered stringent as 
there was no need to be more restrictive than the definition under Article 
85.3(a) of the AP I. It could however be argued that the ICC Statute more 
  
 52. Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgement, ¶ 522 (Jan. 14, 
2000). 
 53. Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶ 55 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003).  
 54. Id.; AP I, supra note 9, art. 52(3); ICRC, supra note 10, r.6 (stating the rules 
for international armed conflicts/non-international armed conflicts); HENCKAERTS & 
DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 17, at 23–24.  
 55. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, ¶ 55. 
 56. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE 
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 994 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) 
[hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS].  
 57. AP I, supra note 9, art. 85(3) (stating that an act is “committed willfully 
[when] . . . (a) making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of 
attack”). 
 58. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, ¶ 180 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000). 
 59. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on Confirmation 
of Charges, ¶ 271 (Sept. 30, 2008); ICC Statute, supra note 20, arts. 8(2)(b)(i), (e)(i) 
(“Intentionally directing attacks”); U.N. Preparatory Commission for the International 
Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, arts. 8(2)(b)(i), (e)(i), PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (Nov. 
2, 2000) [hereinafter ICC Elements of Crimes] (“The perpetrator intended the civilian 
population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities to be the 
object of the attack.”). 
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precisely defines the boundaries between attacks against civilians and 
those which are disproportionate.60 Be that as it may, this more 
demanding subjective element is offset by the fact that under the ICC 
Statute/Elements of Crimes these are crimes of action completed by 
launching the attack.61 This coincides with the ICRC study on customary 
IHL.62 Following Article 85.3(a) of the AP I, the ICTY has required 
“death or serious injury to body or health” to be caused as a result.63  
Nevertheless, as already determined by the ICC,64 it is unnecessary to 
prove a result as this is not a material element under the ICC 
Statute/Elements of Crimes.65 In any event, in most cases a charge would 
not be brought unless there was some actual loss.66 Thus, in application 
of Article 8(2)(e)(i) of the ICC Statute, the ICC Trial Chamber in 
Prosecutor v. Katanga found inter alia that the crime of attack against 
civilians requires no result such as persons killed; however, due to the 
facts of the case, the Chamber took the existent results to demonstrate the 
perpetration of the crime.67  
The required mens rea may be inferred from the fact that necessary 
precautions, such as the use of available intelligence to identify the 
target, were not taken before and during the attack.68 The competent 
court has to assess information available or information that could have 
been reasonably available when the attack occurred, i.e., such evaluation 
cannot be made with hindsight.69 The best manner to establish the 
  
 60. See OLÁSOLO, supra note 49, at 222. 
 61. Id. at 76.  
 62. Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 17, at 577 (discussing 
international armed conflicts).   
 63. AP I, supra note 9, art. 85(3)(a). 
 64. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, ¶ 270. 
 65. See ICC Statute, supra note 20, art. 8(2)(b)(i).  
 66. See W.J. Fenrick, Crimes in Combat: The Relationship Between Crimes 
Against Humanity and War Crimes, in GUEST LECTURE SERIES OF THE ICC OFFICE OF 
THE PROSECUTOR 9 (2004).  
 67. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgement Pursuant to 
Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 871 (Mar. 7, 2014). 
 68. Knut Dörmann, ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 132 (2003) [hereinafter ELEMENTS OF WAR 
CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE].  
 69. See Knut DÖRMANN, Article 8 Para. 2(b)(i), in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 323, 326 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 
2008). 
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reasons behind an attack arguably consists of orders and intelligence 
reports produced by the attacker before and during the incident.70 This 
documentary evidence is arguably the best form to decipher what the 
military commander was thinking when the attack occurred.71 
Considering a lack of relevant documents combined with the hurdles to 
determine the commander’s state of mind from the death, injuries, and 
damage inflicted by the attack, other sources of information and 
inferences prove to be pivotal.72   
Clothing, activity, age, sex, or all of the above of the person attacked 
have been factors to decide whether he was a civilian.73 Distance of the 
victims from the alleged offenders, visibility and weather at the time of 
the attack, and proximity of victims to possible military targets have also 
been regarded as factors to reasonably conclude the non-combatant status 
of targeted individuals.74 The last factor holds particular relevance 
because if a military objective exists and the attack was launched under 
that belief, the attack may be justified.75 Nonetheless, the presence of 
military objectives does not necessarily mean that the attacks did not 
target civilians.76 In cases where the vast majority of victims were 
civilians, the ICTY has inferred that the attack was actually launched 
against them, especially when no military objective was present.77 
However, this finding is not shared by some scholars who consider that 
the ICTY should have differentiated crimes based on attacks against 
civilians from those based on disproportionate attacks.78  
The ICC has correctly differentiated an attack simultaneously 
targeting a military objective and a civilian population in the vicinity not 
taking a direct part in hostilities (an attack against civilians) from an 
  
 70. See OLÁSOLO, supra note 49, at 223. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See id. at 223–24.  
 73. Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶ 50 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003). 
 74. Id. ¶¶ 355, 428.  
 75. Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgement, ¶ 284 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 31, 2005). 
 76. Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Judgement, ¶ 136 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006). 
 77. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 509–11 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000). 
 78. See DÖRMANN, supra note 69, at 327.  
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attack targeting only a military objective but causing excessive collateral 
damage (a disproportionate attack).79 Evidence included previous attacks 
to the village, the absence of a military camp in the vicinity, and 
attackers’ ethnic songs and lyrics.80 However, in cases where the 
anticipated civilian casualties or damages were very notorious, it may 
arguably be inferred for evidentiary purposes that the object of the attack 
was indeed civilian population, civilians, or both.81 Accordingly, 
concerns about merging war crimes should be mitigated. In any event, 
the fact that a civilian was killed or injured does not automatically mean 
a war crime of unlawful attack occurred. For example, projectiles may 
have missed the target or there was a mistake of fact, which negates 
mens rea.82     
The analysis of the means of combat used to carry out the attack may 
lead to inferences such as the following. When it is claimed that the 
attack targeted precise and geographically limited military objectives, 
there is an essential contradiction if blind weapons such as the “baby 
bombs” and cluster bombs are employed.83 This is because these 
weapons are, in certain or all contexts, indiscriminate and their use can 
prove that the attack was launched against civilians as identified by the 
ICTY and the U.N. Special Rapporteurs on Mission to Lebanon and 
Israel.84 The nature and purpose of the attack to target civilians may also 
  
 79. See Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on 
Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 273–74 (Sept. 30, 2008). 
 80. See id. ¶¶ 275–84.  
 81. Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶ 60 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003). 
 82. ICC Statute, supra note 20, art. 32(1).  
 83. There is no categorical prohibition of cluster bombs, but they are 
disproportionate because of their spread effects. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, 
supra note 17, at 250. However, there is already a treaty prohibition for the State Parties 
to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in force since August 1, 2010. See Convention on 
Cluster Munitions, May 30, 2008, 2688 U.N.T.S. 39. 
 84. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, ¶ 512 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000) (“‘[B]aby-bombs’ are [] ‘home-made 
mortars’ [and] are difficult to guide accurately.”); Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-
11-T, Judgement, ¶ 463 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007) 
(“[T]he M-87 Orkan [cluster bomb] is an indiscriminate weapon . . . .”); Rep. of the 
Special Rapporteur on Extraordinary, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/2/7, ¶¶ 52–57 (Oct. 2, 2006) (concerning cluster bombs). 
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be inferred from political statements.85 In some cases, common sense and 
knowledge plus witness testimonies were fundamental to qualify the 
population of a town as substantially civilian.86 Methods of combat used 
during the attack, number and status of victims, a discriminatory purpose 
underlying the attack, respect for precautionary measures under Article 
57 of the AP I, and the type of resistance faced by the attacking party 
have also been used to evaluate whether the attack was primarily 
launched against civilians.87  
IV. Problems Relating to the Notion of “Civilian Object/Military 
Objective” in Unlawful Attacks as War Crimes  
Article 52.1 of AP I contains a negative definition of civilian objects 
“which are not military objectives.”88 Military objectives89 are defined, 
under Article 52.2 of AP I, as “those objects which by their nature, 
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action 
and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the 
circumstances ruling at the time offers, a definite military advantage.”90 
This definition is considered customary IHL and is applicable to 
international and non-international armed conflicts.91 However, it is still 
problematic, especially concerning attribution of criminal liability and 
regardless of some attempts to provide a non-exhaustive list.92   
Since every object other than those under special protection93 may 
potentially become a legitimate military target, the prosecution has to 
  
 85. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, ¶ 390. 
 86. Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgement, ¶ 287 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 31, 2005). 
 87. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, IT-96-23 & 23/1-A, Judgement, ¶ 91 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002). 
 88. AP I, supra note 9, art. 52(1). 
 89. See SASSÒLI & BOUVIER, supra note 1, 202 n.151 (stating that only a 
material object under IHL can be a military objective).  
 90. AP I, supra note 9, art. 52(2). 
 91. ICRC, supra note 10, r.8. 
 92. E.g., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 56, ¶ 2002 
(providing the list of ICRC’s 1956 Draft Rules for the Limitation of Dangers incurred by 
the Civilian Population in Time of War).  
 93. See AP I, supra note 9, art. 56(2). However, if objects under special 
protection are used for military purposes, they can under restricted circumstances become 
military objectives. Id.; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
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strictly apply the above-quoted two-pronged definition.94 The objective 
prong consists of determining whether the object due to its nature, 
location, purpose, or use has “contribut[ed] effectively to military action 
of one side.”95 The prosecutor needs to know the nature, use, purpose, or 
location of the object at the time of the attack and what information the 
military possessed about the object to determine whether a commander 
could have reasonably thought that his targeted object contributed 
effectively to military action of the enemy.96 The subjective prong is to 
assess whether the destruction, capture, or neutralization of the object in 
the circumstances at the time offered “a definite military advantage.”97 
The prosecutor has to reconstruct the military’s assessment of the 
military necessity of destroying an object, i.e., acquire knowledge of the 
parties’ tactical and strategic goals—sometimes changing through the 
armed conflict and normally confidential—existent at the time of the 
attack.98 The ICTY has thus considered the overall situation and result of 
the attack rather than every particular object when assessing whether an 
attack targeted civilian objects.99 Nevertheless, military advantage needs 
to be linked to a definite event and not to a broad concept such as 
winning the entire armed conflict.100  
Presuming that an object is civilian “[i]n case of doubt” of it being 
used to “make an effective contribution to military action”101 has been 
interpreted by the ICTY as restricted to the defendant’s expected 
conduct.102 Only when the object is actually—at least secondarily—and 
not just potentially used for military purposes may it be targeted and only 
  
in Time of War art. 19, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva 
Convention]; SASSÒLI & Bouvier, supra note 1, at 201 n.149.  
 94. See Wuerzner, supra note 35, at 916–17.  
 95. SASSÒLI & Bouvier, supra note 1, at 202. 
 96. See Wuerzner, supra note 35, at 916–17. 
 97. Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶ 51 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003). 
 98. See Wuerzner, supra note 35, at 917. 
 99. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, ¶ 509–10 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000) (analyzing the 1993 attack on Vitez 
and Stari Vitez and concluding the attack was out of proportion to the military necessity). 
 100. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 86, 87 (2004).  
 101. AP I, supra note 9, art. 52(3). 
 102. Prosecutor v. Kordić, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, ¶¶ 48, 53 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004).  
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if precautionary measures are adopted.103 However, concerning the 
criminal liability of the defendant, the ICTY has placed the burden of 
proof on the prosecutor who has to determine whether an object is 
civilian.104 The prosecutor shall thus prove beyond a reasonable doubt the 
defendant’s criminal responsibility for having attacked a civilian object, 
which still may be understandable because battlefield commanders have 
to decide quickly whether an object is a military target.105 Each case must 
be determined on its facts.106        
Cases at the ICTY have mainly concerned ground warfare, involving 
military objectives such as military or paramilitary facilities, a few 
industrial sites, or transportation and communication nodes.107 
Nonetheless, the aerial campaign of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during 
the Kosovo War in 1999 led to an analysis of the concept of military 
objective in the context of aerial attacks, which was conducted by the 
Review Committee on the NATO campaign established by the ICTY 
prosecutor.108 This Committee found that the great majority of targets 
attacked by NATO were military objectives.109 Nevertheless, in its report, 
the Committee continuously casted doubt on the lawfulness of some 
targets including governmental ministries, oil refineries, infrastructure 
used by the military, and media facilities.110 The Committee found that 
media facilities have not traditionally been military objectives,111 even if 
they are only used for propaganda to undermine the morale of the 
adversary armed forces and population.112 The Committee itself 
  
 103. AP I, supra note 9, art. 57(2)(a)(i); ICRC, supra note 10, r.15–16. 
 104. See Kordić, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, ¶ 53.  
 105. See Wuerzner, supra note 35, at 917.  
 106. Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgement, ¶ 295 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 31, 2005).  
 107. See Fenrick, supra note 66, at 5.  
 108. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the 
NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ¶ 3 (June 15, 
2000), http://www.icty.org/en/press/final-report-prosecutor-committee-established-
review-nato-bombing-campaign-against-federal [hereinafter Review Committee on 
NATO].      
 109. Id. ¶ 55.  
 110. See id. ¶¶ 62, 70, 74, 78, 90. 
 111. Id. ¶ 55.     
 112. Id. ¶ 76.  
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considered that only when media facilities are used to incite crimes such 
as genocide can they be targeted.113 This seemingly was not the case of 
the Radio Television of Serbia.114 Accordingly, it would not be a military 
objective. However, the Committee found it to be a military objective as 
it was considered part of the enemy’s system of command, control, and 
communications.115 Be that as it may, the attack may still be unlawful (a 
disproportionate attack)116 as analyzed in the next section.117  
With regard to mens rea, the analysis under the previous section,118 
especially concerning the difference between the ICTY case law and the 
ICC Statute/Elements of Crimes, is applicable. In any event, some 
incidents investigated by the Review Committee on NATO may have 
qualified as reckless attacks against civilian objects and civilians.119 This 
was arguably due to the “zero casualty war” approach under which 
NATO aircrafts operated at heights120 enabling them to avoid the 
defenses but making them unable to distinguish between military and 
civilian objects on the ground.121 Had those incidents been brought 
before the ICC, due to the higher mens rea required in the ICC Statute, it 
would have been difficult to attribute criminal liability for direct attacks 
against civilians or civilian objects. In any event, reckless actions like 
those that arguably occurred in the NATO campaign may be brought 
under other ICC Statute war crimes.122 
On the other hand, bearing in mind the NATO campaign, when the 
prosecutor assesses mens rea of crimes of attacks against civilian objects, 
  
 113. Id. ¶¶ 55, 76.  
 114. AMNESTY INT’L, NATO/FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (FRY): 
“COLLATERAL DAMAGE” OR UNLAWFUL KILLINGS? 26 (2000). 
 115. Review Committee on NATO, supra note 108, ¶¶ 55, 76–77.    
 116. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 114, at 14, 20. 
 117. See generally infra Section V. 
 118. See generally supra Section III. 
 119. See, e.g., Review Committee on NATO, supra note 108, ¶¶ 58–79, 86–89 
(listing the attacks against Grdelica Railroad Bridge, the Serbian State Television and 
Radio, Rorisa village, and the Djakovica-Decan Road convoy).  
 120. See id. ¶ 56 (explaining the campaign adopted a minimum altitude of 15,000 
feet). 
 121. See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 114, at 17. 
 122. ICC Statute, supra note 20, art. 8(2)(b)(xiii), (e)(xiii) (listing both intentional 
and unintentional destruction of the enemy’s property not justified by imperative military 
necessity as an instance where the Court has jurisdiction in respect to war crimes); see 
also OLÁSOLO, supra note 49, at 220.  
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he should determine what the attacker knew about the object, whether 
and what precautionary measures were adopted, and whether the 
principles of distinction and proportionally were enforced.123 Elements 
that may prove the unlawfulness of an attack include weapons used, 
place and time of the attack, and its planning.124 Be that as it may, 
incorrect legal analysis or statements must be avoided. For example, the 
ICTY inaccurately stated that: “[t]argeting civilian property . . . is an 
offence when not justified by military necessity.”125 Since attacking 
civilians or civilian objects is absolutely prohibited (based on the 
principle of distinction), the ICTY’s reference to military necessity was 
misplaced.126  
V. Problems Relating to the Principle of Proportionality in Unlawful 
Attacks as War Crimes 
Serious violations of the principle of proportionality may consist in 
attacks directed against military objectives but that cause excessive 
“collateral damage,” i.e., incidental damage to civilians or civilian 
property resulting from targeting military objectives127 due to the lack of 
precautions in the attack.128 These attacks have not been charged as a 
separate crime in most of the ICTY case law.129 The ICTY has regarded 
  
 123. Wuerzner, supra note 35, at 919. 
 124. See id. 
 125. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, ¶ 180 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000).  
 126. See Elements of War Crimes Under the Rome Statute, supra note 68, at 
149.  
 127. See AP I, supra note 9, art. 51(5)(b); see also ICRC, supra note 10, r.14 
(explaining that Rule 14 is applicable in both international armed conflicts and non-
international armed conflicts). 
 128. See AP I, supra note 9, art. 57; see also ICRC, supra note 10, r.15, 17–21 
(explaining the applicability of each rule in international armed conflicts and non-
international armed conflicts).  
 129. E.g., Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶¶ 
57–62, 752 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003); Blaškić, Case No. 
IT-95-14-T, ¶¶ 12, 180; Prosecutor v. Kordić, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 
321, 326–28 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001); see also 
OLÁSOLO, supra note 49, at 157; Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, 
Judgement, ¶ 178 (Jan. 31, 2005). In addition to direct attack on civilians and civilian 
objects, the Prosecutor in Strugar charged alternatively with disproportionate attacks; Id. 
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those violations mainly as evidence of attacks directed against civilians 
or civilian objects.130 This is different from the ICC Statute that 
criminalizes serious violations of the principle of proportionality as an 
independent offence. This is considered herein as appropriate. The fact 
that an object is a military objective does not automatically make it 
targetable is misunderstood by the U.S. Department of Defense.131 This is 
because the anticipated collateral damage under the proportionality test 
has to be evaluated. Serious violations of the principle of proportionality 
may be used to infer the intent to launch attacks against civilians and 
civilian objects.132 However, attacks targeting civilians and civilian 
objects are distinct from attacks that end up being unlawful.133 This is 
because of the excessive incidental damage brought about by the latter 
kind of attacks even though they may have in principle been lawful as 
they were launched against a military objective.134  
Nevertheless, the ICC prosecutor faces an extra challenge. This 
consists in that the ICC Statute does not include an autonomous or 
specific war crime of disproportionate attack in non-international armed 
conflicts. An option to indirectly fill this gap, as mentioned,135 is to 
follow the ICTY case law. According to the ICTY, disproportionate 
attacks, which are a form of indiscriminate attack under AP I,136 may lead 
  
However, the Chamber considered examination of this alternative charge to be 
unnecessary due to the circumstances of the case and found the accused guilty of direct 
attacks against civilians and civilian objects. See id. ¶¶ 478–79.   
 130. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Judgement, ¶ 132 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006); Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-
98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶ 57–62 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Dec. 5, 2003); Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgement, ¶ 69 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007). 
 131. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., FINAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE CONDUCT OF 
THE PERSIAN GULF WAR 613 (1992) (“Coalition forces also chose not to attack many 
military targets in populated areas.”).  
 132. See OLÁSOLO, supra note 49, at 157. 
 133. See id. 
 134. See id.  
 135. See supra Section III. 
 136. AP I, supra note 9, arts. 51(5)(b), 85(3)(b)  
(“Among others, the following types of attacks are to be 
considered indiscriminate . . . (b) an attack which may be 
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
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to inferences that civilians were the direct object of the attack in certain 
circumstances.137 This conduct is criminalized even when committed in 
non-international armed conflicts under the ICC Statute.138 Nevertheless, 
the circumstances that may trigger such inference are unclear. The ICTY 
has concluded that it depends on some factual circumstances such as 
means, methods, and nature of the crimes committed during the attack; 
resistance to the assailants at the time; and the extent to which the 
attacking force complied or tried to comply with precautionary 
measures.139 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the ICTY have 
equated the use of indiscriminate weapons with a deliberate attack 
against civilians.140 Applying the principle of proportionality in criminal 
trials is complex as this involves a value-based judgment that requires 
that military commanders weigh expected harm or damage to civilians 
and civilian objects against the anticipated military advantage from the 
attack.141            
A problem in the ICC Statute negotiations was how to adapt the 
formulation of proportionality contained in the AP I.142 The compromise 
  
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated.”);  
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 56, ¶¶ 1976–79; see also 
Protocol II to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Convention as 
amended on 3 May 1996 art. 3(8)(c), May 3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 93 (entered into force 
Dec. 3, 1998) (applying to international armed conflicts and non-international armed 
conflicts). Although AP I does not consider those attacks as an independent category, but 
as a sub-category of indiscriminate attacks, they are actually directed against military 
objectives. See OLÁSOLO, supra note 49, at 19.  
 137. See Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Judgement, ¶ 132 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006). The ICTY concluded that indiscriminate 
attacks do not always amount to direct attacks but rather they may qualify as such. Id.   
 138. ICC Statute, supra note 20, art. 8(2)(e)(iv).   
 139. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-A, ¶ 132.  
 140. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 13, ¶ 78; 
Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgement, ¶ 69 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007) (“[I]ndiscriminate attacks . . . may also be qualified as 
direct attacks on civilians . . . . [A] direct attack against civilians can be inferred from the 
indiscriminate character of the weapon used.”) (footnotes omitted).   
 141. ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 59, art. 8(2)(b)(iv) n.36 (2011). The ICC 
Elements of Crimes read that “‘concrete and direct overall military advantage’” means “a 
military advantage that is foreseeable by the perpetrator at the relevant time.” Id.  
 142. See Roberta Arnold & Stefan Wehrenberg, Article 8 Para. 2(b)(iv), in 
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 375, 377 
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reached was to take the AP I as a basis and add the words “clearly” and 
“overall,” raising the evidentiary threshold.143 Considering that the 
principle of legality requires specificity, that addition may be understood 
to mean that the defendant will have a wider margin of appreciation.144 
The ICC prosecutor has to prove that the accused knew that the attack 
would cause incidental death or injury to civilians of a clearly excessive 
nature in relation to the military advantage sought.145 This has to be 
assessed by the ICC objectively from the perspective of a reasonable 
commander146 and considering the defendant’s knowledge of the 
“information available to the perpetrator at the time” that led him make a 
value judgment147 and not on the basis of subsequent information.148 
However, the “reasonable commander” standard may be considered as 
not very useful. This corresponds to the fact that even among military 
commanders such evaluation may change according to their national 
military history, military backgrounds and combat experience.149 The 
“reasonable person” standard used by the ICTY150 is even broader. For 
example, a lawyer normally possesses an understanding of “excessive” 
that differs from that of a military commander.151 Such level of 
subjectivity makes it difficult to bring charges for the war crime of a 
disproportionate attack. Although the “reasonable military commander” 
  
(Otto Triffterer & Kai Ambos eds., 3rd ed. 2016); WILLIAM SCHABAS, THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE 264 (2d 
ed. 2016). 
 143. See Arnold & Wehrenberg, supra note 142, at 377; SCHABAS, supra note 
142, at 264–66.  
 144. See Arnold & Wehrenberg, supra note 142, at 377; SCHABAS, supra note 
142, at 265–66. 
 145. ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 59, art. 8(2)(b)(iv).  
 146. Elements of War Crimes Under the Rome Statute, supra note 68, at 164. 
 147. ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 59, art. 8(2)(b)(iv) n.37.   
 148. See William Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in 
Conventional Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 61, 109 (1982).  
 149. Review Committee on NATO, supra note 108, ¶ 52.   
 150. Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶ 58 
n.110 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003).  
 151. See Wuerzner, supra note 35, at 922; REVIEW COMMITTEE ON NATO, supra 
note 108, ¶ 50. The above-mentioned difference consists in the scope of what is 
permissible as “excessive” determined by inter alia dissimilar doctrinal backgrounds, 
combat experience and/or national military history. Id.     
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standard is more suitable to apply the principle of proportionality,152 
civilian judges would need to be trained on war-related matters to assess 
serious violations thereof.153  
Like Article 85.3(b) of the AP I, the ICC Statute/Elements of Crimes 
require that the attack was launched in the knowledge that the 
consequences described will occur.154 The ICRC considers that 
recklessness would not be included as mens rea of this crime.155 The 
expression “intentionally launching [the] attack” in Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of 
the ICC Statute also leads to conclude that the prosecutor has to prove 
dolus.156 The actual results of the attack, a material element in the ICC 
Statute/Elements of Crimes, may help to infer the intent and knowledge 
of the attacker.157 To prove the expectation of excessive incidental losses 
or damages, the prosecutor may consider: i) location of military 
objectives (vicinity of civilian objects); ii) accuracy of the weapon 
including its dispersion, range, ammunition used; iii) weather conditions 
such as wind or low visibility; iv) technical skills of combatants; and v) 
specific nature of the military objective.158 For example, in the NATO 
aerial campaign during the Kosovo War in 1999, the NATO pilot who 
continued his attack after hitting a train on a bridge suggests that he 
understood his mission as destroying the bridge regardless of civilian 
casualties, which would violate the principle of proportionality.159 
There are three possible approaches or frames of analysis under which 
evidence may be examined: i) the overall objective sought, i.e., mission’s 
objective (the strategic level); ii) the attack in question (the operational 
  
 152. See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 56, ¶ 2208 
(discussing “common sense and good faith for military commanders”).  
 153. See Michael Bothe, The Protection of the Civilian Population and NATO 
Bombing on Yugoslavia: Comments on Report to the Prosecutor of the ICTY, 12 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 531, 535 (2001). 
 154. ICC Statute, supra note 20, art. 8(2)(b)(iv); ICC Elements of Crimes, supra 
note 59, art. 8(2)(b)(iv).  
 155. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 56, ¶ 3479. 
 156. ICC Statute, supra note 20, art. 8(2)(b)(iv). 
 157. See Wuerzner, supra note 35, at 920–21. 
 158. See id. at 922. 
 159. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 114, at 2. See AP I, supra note 9, art. 57(2)(c) 
(discussing the effectiveness of advanced warning); ICRC, supra note 10, r.20 
(explaining that Rule 14 is application in both international armed conflicts and non-
international armed conflicts).  
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level); and iii) objective-by-objective or incident-by-incident (the tactical 
level).160 This article argues that the tactical level should be mainly 
considered as complemented by the operational level analysis rather than 
the strategic level for the following reasons.  
First, the ICRC arguably adopts the above-suggested approach 
because it considers that both: i) the attack must be directed against a 
military objective with means not disproportionate in relation to the 
objective; and ii) these means are suited only to destroy that objective 
and in relation to it.161 Also, the ICRC mentions that precautionary 
measures are not concerned with “strategie objectives but with the means 
to be used in a specific tactical operation.”162 The ICRC AP I 
Commentary concludes that the military advantage must be “substantial and 
relatively close, and that advantages which are hardly perceptible and those 
which would only appear in the long term should be disregarded.”163 In turn, the 
use of “concrete” and “direct” as qualifiers of “military advantage” in the 
ICC Statute164 is not compatible with an analysis at the strategic level. 
Conversely, the common denominator in the AP I and the ICC is that a 
definite military advantage is required for each selected target.165  
Second, proportionality at the strategic level risks equating the 
proportional use of force in an offensive and defensive combat action 
(ius in bellum) with the lawful resort to armed force in self-defence (ius 
ad bellum).166 The strategic level was indeed partially considered by the 
U.S. during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.167 The Report on NATO also 
partially used a strategic level approach in the analysis of the attack 
against the headquarters of the Radio Television of Serbia.168 As 
  
 160. See William Fenrick, The Prosecution of Unlawful Attacks before the ICTY, 
in 7 Y.B. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 153, 176 (2004); OLÁSOLO, supra note 49, at 170.  
 161. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 56, ¶ 1979.  
 162. Id. ¶ 2207.  
 163. Id. ¶ 2209.  
 164. ICC Statute, supra note 20, art. 8(2)(b)(iv). 
 165. Arnold & Wehrenberg, supra note 142, at 378.  
 166. See ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 68, 
at 171; OLÁSOLO, supra note 49, at 174. See also ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 
59, art. 8(2)(b)(iv), n.36 (“It does not address justifications for . . . other rules related to 
jus ad bellum.”).  
 167. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 131, at 613 (noting that “military advantage” 
is “linked to the full context of a war strategy . . . the liberation of Kuwait”).  
 168. See REVIEW COMMITTEE ON NATO, supra note 108, ¶¶ 71–79. 
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discussed in the previous section, whether these headquarters were a 
legitimate military objective is controversial.169 However, even assuming 
so, under the tactical level approach that attack would have been found 
disproportionate as the Radio Television of Serbia was operative again 
only after three hours.170 Also, this attack was without effective advance 
warning, was launched at night, and killed 16 civilians.171 Nevertheless, 
the Committee on NATO found it not to be disproportionate by using the 
strategic level approach as the collateral damage was compared with the 
military advantage anticipated from the achievement of excessively 
broad goals such as the partial or total disruption of the command, 
control, and communications system of the Yugoslav Armed Forces.172 
The use of the strategic level approach may be a reason why no 
investigation was opened.  
Third, the principle of proportionality at the strategic level largely 
increases the amount of lawful incidental civilian losses and damages 
and decreases the protection granted to civilians and civilian objects 
under the principle of distinction, as implied by the ICRC.173  
Fourth, the ICTY case law has applied tactical level analysis with 
regard to specific targets,174 rejecting the strategic level approach.175 An 
important deal of the ICTY case law has also applied the operational 
level analysis.176 Two reasons may explain the use of the operational 
level analysis. On the one hand, the ICTY cases on prosecutions of 
unlawful attacks have dealt with top military commanders or, at least, 
middle ranking commanders who normally give orders at the operational 
  
 169. See supra Section IV. 
 170. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 114, at 26; see also Review Committee on 
NATO, supra note 108, ¶ 77. 
 171. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 114, at 49. 
 172. Review Committee on NATO, supra note 108, ¶¶ 77–78.  
 173. See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 56, ¶ 1979.  
 174. Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶¶ 208, 
387 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003) (explaining that the Trial 
Chamber analyzed specific incidents of sniping and shelling of civilians). 
 175. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, ¶¶ 208–09. 
 176. Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgement, ¶ 214 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 31, 2005); Prosecutor v. Kordić, Case No. IT-95-
14/2-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 565–76, 646–49, 738–53 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001).  
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level.177 On the other hand, an excessively narrow tactical level analysis 
might in certain circumstances ignore difficulties faced by modern 
warfare strategies based on an integrated set of targets as part of a 
military operation or attack.178   
Although single attacks against military objectives causing incidental 
damage are not in principle unlawful, if repeated “the cumulative effect 
of such acts . . . may not be in keeping with international law.”179 The 
minimization of collateral damage is the responsibility not only of the 
attacker but also of the defender due to the obligation to adopt 
precautions against the effects of the attack,180 including the prohibited 
use of human shields181 which is also a war crime.182 However, the fact 
that the defenders disregard those precautions does not exonerate the 
attacker from adopting precautionary measures in attacks.183 In IHL, the 
burden is always on the attacker and hence this cannot be shifted.184 This 
is not opposed to the prosecutors’ burden of proof relating to individual 
criminal responsibility.185 Even civilians who voluntarily become human 
shields do not, without more, lose their protection as civilians.186  
  
 177. Olásolo, supra note 49, at 172.  
 178. See Stefan Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat, in HANDBOOK OF INT’L 
HUMANITARIAN L. 105, 186 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008). HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-
BECK, supra note 17, at 49. Some states when ratified the AP I declared that the military 
advantage anticipated has to be considered as a whole attack and not from isolated parts 
thereof. Id.  
 179. Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgement, ¶ 526 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000).  
 180. AP I, supra note 9, art. 58; ICRC, supra note 10, r.22–24; see SASSÒLI & 
BOUVIER, supra note 1, at 214. This is also called “Conduct of Defence.” Id. 
 181. ICRC, supra note 10, r. 97.  
 182. See ICC Statute, supra note 20, art. 8(2)(b)(xxiv); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case 
No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 715–16 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 
3, 2000); HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 17, at 580.    
 183. Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 17, at 71. 
 184. See id. 
 185. ICC Statute, supra note 20, arts. 66, 67(1)(i) (discussing presumption of 
innocence and not reversing the burden of proof for the accused). 
 186. Melzer, supra note 29, at 57.  
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VI. Practical Problems Relating to Prosecution of Unlawful Attacks 
as War Crimes 
A. Access to Evidence 
As seen, the reconstruction of the decision-making process which 
underlies war crimes of unlawful attacks is fundamental to attribute 
criminal liability.187 However, a hurdle facing such reconstruction is that 
the respective information, especially documents, normally involves 
highly confidential issues and, therefore, is rarely made public.188 
Nevertheless, the determination of criminal responsibility cannot be 
made with hindsight, namely, such a finding needs to be based on the 
information available to the offender(s) or the existence of the offender’s 
reckless failure to obtain information when the crime was committed. .189 
The ICTY and the ICC as international judicial institutions depend on the 
cooperation of national justice authorities, but states can attempt to block 
disclosure of information to the prosecution on the ground of national 
security, which actually happened at the ICTY.190 This is even more 
difficult at the ICC. While the ICTY as a Security Council subsidiary 
organ can request cooperation, including access to evidence, by all U.N. 
Member States, the ICC can only obligate States that are parties to the 
ICC Statute,191 unless the situation was referred to the ICC by the 
Security Council.192   
The ICTY’s broader powers to access evidence actually constitute a 
strong reason to criticize the recommendation by the Review Committee 
on NATO that consisted in not opening an investigation. This was based 
  
 187. See supra Sections III–V.  
 188. See Wuerzner, supra note 35, at 927–28.  
 189. See id. (invoking The Hostages Trial: Trial of Wilhelm List and Others, 8 L. 
RPTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 34, 57 (U.N. War Crimes Comm. ed., 1948), ¶ 69).  
 190. See Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-AR108 bis, Judgement on the 
Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 
July 1997, ¶¶ 61–63 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 29, 1997). 
 191. See Int’l Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia since 1991, Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, art. 29 (Sept. 2009), [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; ICC Statute, supra 
note 20, arts. 86–87.  
 192. See ICC Statute, supra note 20, art. 13(b). 
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on the following controversial conclusion: “investigations [were] 
unlikely to result in the acquisition of sufficient evidence to substantiate 
charges against high level accused or against lower accused for 
particularly heinous offences.”193 This should have been a reason for the 
prosecutor and the ICTY to make use of their powers,194 which were 
unavailable to the Committee.195 Had the NATO situation been brought 
to the ICC, the ICC prosecutor would, however, have faced a tougher 
decision as, even concerning States that are parties to the ICC Statute, 
grounds for state objection to disclosure are broader under the ICC 
Statute.196  
International tribunals, unlike domestic courts, lack the ability to seize 
evidentiary material, make searches, compel witnesses to give testimony, 
or execute arrests without the cooperation of national authorities.197 To 
compensate the lack of access to evidence, the ICTY prosecutor, in war 
crimes of unlawful attacks, has relied on a wide variety of evidentiary 
material. This has included inter alia:198 i) open source material such as 
newspapers containing accounts tracking down the casualties and gains 
of both sides, particularly of the accused, or media interviews of the 
accused or both; ii) witness statements including “insider” witnesses 
from the same military of the defendant; iii) expert witnesses on 
command and control as well as artillery or weapons issues; and iv) 
  
 193. Review Committee on NATO, supra note 108, ¶ 90. 
 194. See, e.g., ICTY Statute, supra note 191, art. 18 (concerning investigation and 
preparation of an indictment); Int’l Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible 
for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, r. 39, IT/32/Rev. 50 
(July 8, 2015) [hereinafter ICTY Rules].   
 195. See Paolo Benvenuti, The ICTY Prosecutor and the Review of the NATO 
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
503, 505 (2001).    
 196. See ICC Statute, supra note 20, art. 72(4–6). 
 197. See Matthew R. Brubacher, Prosecutorial Discretion within the International 
Criminal Court, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 71, 88 (2004).   
 198. See Fenrick, supra note 160, at 185–86.  
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maps, computer graphics199 and site visits known as “crime scene 
visits.”200  
Evidence showing that forces under the defendant’s command caused 
death, injury, or damage is insufficient without bringing relevant 
evidence of the surrounding circumstances.201 The circumstances and 
context (the “big picture”), which are frequently proved via 
circumstantial evidence, are a prosecutor’s powerful tools to prove the 
commission of the war crimes of unlawful attacks.202 In Katanga, the 
ICC Trial Chamber considered the following elements to find criminal 
responsibility for the war crime of attack against civilians: i) timing of 
the attack; ii) means and method used (encirclement of the village whilst 
its inhabitants were asleep); iii) use of machetes; iv) indiscriminate or 
direct shooting; and v) the civilian death toll (including children, women, 
and elderly people).203     
In some contexts, state cooperation may indeed be in the own interest 
of the state to accurately determine whether and to what extent a party to 
an armed conflict violated IHL and its members committed war crimes. 
This is illustrated by the U.N. Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza 
Conflict, which “had no access to information from the Israeli armed 
forces about what particular commanders or soldiers knew at the time of 
the attacks,”204 as reaffirmed by the Head of the said mission Richard 
Goldstone when he later commented on the Mission’s findings.205  
  
 199. See Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶¶ 
275, 280 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003). For example, 
computer graphics and 360 degree panoramic pictures and films to indicate what 
probably happened during the snipping incidents were used. Id.  
 200. See INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA & UNITED 
NATIONS INTERREGIONAL CRIME AND JUSTICE RESEARCH INST., ICTY MANUAL ON 
DEVELOPED PRACTICES 100–02 (2009).  
 201. See Fenrick, supra note 160, at 187. 
 202. See id. at 186–88. 
 203. Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgement Pursuant to Article 74 of 
the Statute, ¶ 878 (Mar. 7, 2014). 
 204. Laurie R. Blank, The Application of IHL in the Goldstone Report: A Critical 
Commentary, 12 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 347, 392 (2009).  
 205. Richard Goldstone, Reconsidering the Goldstone Report on Israel and War 
Crimes, WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2011), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/reconsidering-the-goldstone-report-on-israel-
and-war-crimes/2011/04/01/AFg111JC_story.html?utm_term=.8efd1acd9570  
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At the ICC, lack of evidence also affects the determination of criminal 
liability for unlawful attacks.206 In Prosecutor v. Katanga, concerning a 
particular incident, people fleeing a camp included both civilians and 
troops.207 Due to evidence limitations, the Chamber could not find the 
exact proportion of civilians and soldiers within this group.208 Thus, the 
Chamber could not conclude that the civilian population was targeted as 
such since Article 8(2)(e)(i) of the ICC Statute “requires the Chamber to 
establish that the perpetrator meant the civilian population, as such, to be 
the object of the attack.”209 
B. Selecting Modes of Liability Suitable for Prosecutorial Strategy 
The ICTY has mostly used three criminal responsibility modes in 
cases of senior military commanders: ordering, aiding and abetting, and 
command responsibility.210 These modes are also incorporated in the ICC 
Statute.211 They complement the modes of liability as a principal, i.e., 
direct perpetration, co-perpetration, and perpetration through another 
person, enunciated in the ICC Statute,212 and used by the ICC when 
confirming charges213 or when issuing arrest warrants concerning direct 
attacks on civilians, civilian objects, or both.214 If there is enough 
  
(“Israel’s lack of cooperation with our investigation meant that 
we were not able to corroborate how many Gazans killed were 
civilians and how many were combatants. The Israeli military’s 
numbers have turned out to be similar to those recently furnished 
by Hamas . . . . The purpose of the Goldstone Report was never 
to prove a foregone conclusion against Israel . . . . We made our 
recommendations based on the record before us, which 
unfortunately did not include any evidence provided by the 
Israeli government.”).   
 206. See Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, ¶ 875. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id.  
 210. ICTY Statute, supra note 191, arts. 7(1), (3).  
 211. ICC Statute, supra note 20, art. 25(3)(b–d). 
 212. Id. art. 25(3)(a). 
 213. See Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-02/07, Decision on the Confirmation 
of Charges, ¶ 575 (Sept. 30, 2008).   
 214. For a discussion on arrest warrants, see, e.g., Prosecutor vs. Al Bashir, ICC-
02/05-01/09, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against 
 
2018] The Challenging Prosecution of Unlawful Attacks as War Crimes 437 
evidence about the existence of an order to launch an unlawful attack, the 
prosecutor’s strategy should be to charge the defendant with having 
ordered an unlawful attack. If not so, command responsibility, which is 
responsibility for omission with a lower mens rea and hence easier to 
prove, may be applied as an alternative mode of responsibility.215 The 
access to direct evidence is normally difficult. However, this gap has 
been filled with circumstantial evidence to prove the existence of 
responsibility of superiors for unlawful attacks based on:   
(a) The number of illegal acts; 
(b) The type of illegal acts; 
(c) The scope of illegal acts; 
(d) The time during which the illegal acts occurred; 
(e) The number and type of troops involved; 
(f) The logistics involved, if any; 
(g) The geographical location of the acts; 
(h) The widespread occurrence of the acts; 
(i) The tactical tempo of operations; 
(j) The modus operandi of similar illegal acts; 
(k) The officers and staff involved; [and] 
(l) The location of the commander at the time.216  
  
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶¶ 4, 7 (Mar. 4, 2009); Prosecutor v. Ali Kushayb, ICC-
02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest For Ali Kushayb, counts 1, 6 (Apr. 27, 2007). 
 215. See Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant to 
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ¶¶ 342, 402 (June 15, 2009).  
 216. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement, ¶ 386 (Nov. 16, 
1998); see also Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, ¶ 429.  
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With regard to mens rea of command responsibility, the ICTY Statute 
follows to an important extent the AP I217 requirement that the 
commander knew or had reason to know that his subordinate was about 
to commit or committed unlawful attacks.218 However, the ICC Statute 
has introduced two different mens rea thresholds depending on whether 
the accused is a military superior—where negligence is sufficient—or a 
non-military superior—where dolus is required.219 The evidentiary 
threshold to charge and convict military superiors has thus been lowered 
as the ICC prosecutor only needs to prove that the military superior 
behaved negligently.220 Although the mens rea of the mode of liability 
and that of the crime itself are two different things, it still results in the 
difficult to accept idea that unlawful attacks requiring intent as mens rea 
under the ICC Statute may be committed with mere negligence of the 
military commander.221  
In Prosecutor v. Katanga, which is so far the only ICC conviction for 
the war crime of attacks against civilians, the defendant was found guilty 
as an accessory to the crime under Article 25(3)(d) of the ICC Statute.222 
This conviction followed a change pursuant to Regulation 55 (Authority 
of the Chamber to modify the legal characterisation of facts) of the 
Regulations of the Court.223 Thus, considering the circumstances of the 
  
 217. AP I, supra note 9, art. 86(2) (“[I]f they knew, or had information which 
should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time, that he [his 
subordinate] was committing or was going to commit such a breach . . . .”); see also AP I, 
supra note 9, art. 87(3) (Titled “Duty of commanders,” referring to being “aware”); ICTY 
Statute, art. 7(3) (“[The superior] knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was 
about to commit [ICTY crimes] or had done so and the superior failed to take the 
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or punish the perpetrators 
thereof.”). 
 218. See Prosecutor v. Strugar, IT-01-42-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 301–02 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 17, 2008). The standard “had reason to know” has 
been interpreted as requiring that military commanders have had information available to 
them that should have put them on notice of the need to set in motion an investigation. Id.   
 219. See ICC Statute, supra note 20, art. 28(a)(i) (“knew or, owing to the 
circumstances at the time, should have known”); see also id. art. 28(b)(i) (“knew, or 
consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated . . . .”).  
 220. See Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, ¶ 429. 
 221. See OLÁSOLO, supra note 49, at 213.  
 222. Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgement Pursuant to Article 74 of 
the Statute, ¶ 658 (Mar. 7, 2014). 
 223. See id. ¶¶ 1423–595.   
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case and with respect for the rights of the accused, the legal 
characterisation of the mode of liability initially applied to Prosecutor v. 
Katanga under Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute (indirect co-
perpetration) was changed with Article 25(3)(d) (“accessoryship through 
a contribution made ‘in any other way to the commission of a crime by a 
group of persons acting with a common purpose.’”).224 This outcome 
arguably evidences the challenges to identify the mode of criminal 
responsibility that better reflects the acts of the accused and accords with 
available evidence.    
C. Prosecutorial Discretion to Open Investigations and/or Bring 
Charges 
Even assuming that the prosecutor has managed to gather enough 
evidence, he can use his discretion not to open investigations, bring 
charges, or both.225 This discretion, however, as illustrated in the decision 
of not opening an investigation into the alleged commission of unlawful 
attacks by NATO effectives, may be highly controversial. Former ICTY 
Prosecutor Del Ponte concluded that “there [was] no basis for opening an 
investigation into any of the allegations or into other incidents related to 
the NATO air campaign.”226 Even though it was conceded that NATO 
made some mistakes, she surprisingly announced that she was “satisfied 
that there was no deliberate targeting of civilians or unlawful military 
targets by NATO during the campaign.”227 Although this decision not to 
investigate was welcomed by NATO members, most of the legal 
literature has suggested that it was not a legal but a political factor that 
determined the ICTY Prosecutor’s decision.228 Notwithstanding the 
  
 224. Id. ¶ 658. 
 225. See Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of Comoros, the Hellenic 
Republic of Greece and the Kingdom of Cambodia, ICC-01/13 OA, Decision on the 
Admissibility of the Prosecutor’s Appeal Against the “Decision on the Request of the 
Union of the Comoros to Review the Prosecutor’s Decision not to Initiate an 
Investigation,” ¶ 59 (Nov. 6, 2015).  
 226. Press Release, Prosecutor, Prosecutor’s Report on the NATO Bombing 
Campaign, U.N. Press Release PR/ P.I.S./ 510-e (June 13, 2000).  
 227. Id. 
 228. See, e.g., Anne-Sophie Massa, NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo and the 
Decision of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia Not to Investigate: An Abusive Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 
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necessity of prosecutorial discretion and case selectivity,229 the ICTY has 
said that exercise of prosecutorial discretion is not unlimited.230 As 
analyzed,231 some of the “mistakes” made by NATO actually merited an 
investigation. This in turn is the sine qua non condition to later determine 
criminal responsibility for unlawful attacks.232 Unfortunately, the fact 
that there was no investigation increased some perception of the ICTY as 
a manifestation of victor’s justice against Serbs.233  
At the ICC, prosecutorial discretion has two important restrictions. 
First, when the prosecutor wants to initiate an investigation proprio 
motu,234 the Pre-Trial Chamber’s authorization is necessary.235 Second, 
when the prosecutor decides not to investigate or prosecute because 
investigation or prosecution “would not serve the interests of justice,” the 
Pre-Trial Chamber shall be informed.236 This decision may be reviewed 
by the Chamber and only becomes effective if the Chamber decides so.237 
When a situation is referred to the ICC by the Security Council or by a 
State Party to the ICC Statute, the ICC prosecutor must also inform the 
Chamber and the respective referring entity when the prosecutor decides 
not to investigate or prosecute based on the “contrary to the interests of 
justice” ground.238 The review request can also be brought by the 
referring entity and based on something other than the “interests of 
  
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 610, 642 (2006); Natalino Ronzitti, Is the Non Liquet of the Final 
Report by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Acceptable?, 82 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 1017, 1020 
(2000).  
 229. See ICTY Statute, supra note 191, art. 18(1) (discussing ICTY Prosecutor’s 
discretion to proceed).  
 230. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgement, ¶ 602 (Feb. 20, 
2001). 
 231. See supra Sections IV–V. 
 232. See REVIEW COMMITTEE ON NATO, supra note 108, ¶ 90–91. 
 233. See Victor Peskin, Beyond Victor’s Justice? The Challenge of Prosecuting 
the Winners at the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, 4 J. HUM. RTS. 213, 228 (2005); See generally YUVAL SHANY, ASSESSING THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS: A GOAL-BASED APPROACH (2014). 
 234. ICC Statute, supra note 20, art. 15(1). 
 235. Id. art. 15(4).   
 236. Id. arts. 53(1), 53(1)(c), 53(2)(c) (concerning investigation and prosecution 
respectively).       
 237. Id. art. 53(3)(b).  
 238. Id. art. 53(2)(c). 
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justice” ground.239 Thus, the ICC Statute has set some judicial control 
over excessive prosecutorial discretion. Had a NATO-like situation been 
brought before the ICC, it is reasonable to believe that a Chamber would 
not have confirmed a prosecutor’s hypothetical decision not to 
investigate based on the “contrary to the interests of justice” ground. The 
prosecutor would have hence been compelled to reconsider his decision. 
It has been said that the ICC should adopt the policy of generally not 
investigating cases based entirely on collateral damages.240 However, this 
article argues that the ICC prosecutor should investigate this kind of case 
in order to implement the principle of proportionality. In any event, 
concerning unlawful attacks, the ICC has so far found responsibility only 
for attacks against civilians in Katanga.241  
Additionally, following the ICTY, for evidentiary purposes and 
according to the circumstances, investigating cases based on collateral 
damages may allow an inference that an attack targeted civilians or 
civilian objects.242 These factors should be considered to bring charges in 
the investigation in the situation in Libya referred to the ICC by the 
Security Council.243 This would also be the case if the ICC prosecutor 
decides to open an investigation into alleged war crimes committed in 
Palestine.244 This article argues that the recommendations of the U.N. 
Special Rapporteurs on Mission to Israel/Lebanon given to an 
International Commission of Inquiry245 and Israel246 to investigate 
whether war crimes of disproportionate attacks were committed may be 
  
 239. Id. arts. 53(1)(c), (3)(a).  
 240. Richard Galvin, The ICC Prosecutor, Collateral Damage, and NGOs: 
Evaluating the Risk of a Politicized Prosecution, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 
89 (2005).  
 241. Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgement Pursuant to Article 74 of 
the Statute, ¶¶ 871–79 (Mar. 7, 2014). 
 242. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 509–11 (Mar. 3, 
2000).    
 243. See S.C. Res. 1970, ¶¶ 4–8 (Feb. 26, 2011). 
 244. See Rep. of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 
supra note 36, ¶¶ 1767, 1773. 
 245. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extraordinary, Summary or Arbitrary 
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considered mutatis mutandi by the ICC prosecutor when deciding to 
open an investigation.  
Although the Security Council mentioned serious IHL violations in its 
referral of the Libyan situation to the ICC, it decided that non-Libyan 
nationals involved in international crimes committed in Libya would be 
out of the ICC’s jurisdiction and be judged in their respective States.247 
This is criticized herein. This article considers that the said Security 
Council’s restriction concerning non-Libyan nationals prevents 
investigations into and prosecutions of alleged unlawful attacks related to 
the 2011 NATO’s air strikes in Libya. Thus, individuals have been 
pushed to look for justice at national foreign jurisdictions. Civil litigation 
for alleged excessive collateral damage out of NATO’s strikes in Libya 
before Belgian courts illustrates this point.248 Moreover, the ICC has only 
considered three Libyan cases: two already closed because of Gaddafi’s 
death and the ICC’s decision respectively, and the third one against 
Gaddafi’s eldest son (detained in Libya) has not included attacks against 
civilians as war crimes.249  
On the other hand, the investigation into the situation in Georgia 
opened in 2016 involves attacks against civilian population allegedly 
committed in the context of the international armed conflict between 
Russia and Georgia between July and October 2008 in and around South 
Ossetia.250 Additionally, ICC’s preliminary investigations into Ukraine, 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Colombia, and Palestine may lead to investigations.251 
Unlawful attacks should be considered in both the Libyan situation and, 
potentially, if and once the said preliminary investigations become 
investigations. Finally, the ICC, a special international or hybrid criminal 
court, or both must prosecute unlawful attacks committed in Syria. As 
Syria is not a State Party to the ICC Statute, the referral of the situation 
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in Syria by the Security Council to the ICC is the mechanism to trigger 
the ICC jurisdiction.252 However, this would demand the consensus of the 
five permanent members of the Security Council.253 Unfortunately, this 
referral seems unlikely in the near future due to realpolitik 
considerations.254  
VII. Conclusions 
Prosecuting unlawful attacks as war crimes at the international level 
proves to be quite challenging. “Civilian,” “civilian object,” and 
“proportionality” are elusive notions. In criminal prosecutions, the 
situation is even more complex due to inter alia the need for evidence of 
the required mens rea.255 The ICC Statute both eases and increases the 
job of the ICC prosecutor. On the one hand, the ICC Statute has for the 
first time in an international instrument criminalized attacks against 
civilians and civilian objects committed in non-international armed 
conflicts.256 Additionally, as examined in this article, the war crimes of 
unlawful attacks are well-detailed in the ICC Statute/Elements of Crimes 
and attacks against civilians and civilian objects are mere action crimes 
as they do not require a result.257 In these points, this article concludes 
that the job of the prosecutor should be easier at the ICC than at the 
ICTY. However, the war crimes of attacks against civilians and civilian 
objects, unlike the ICTY case law, require evidence of intent and, thus, 
evidence of recklessness is insufficient.258 Moreover, the absence of a 
war crime of attacks against civilian objects and of a war crime of 
disproportionate attacks in non-international armed conflicts under the 
ICC Statute does not match customary IHL. Nonetheless, this article 
concludes that the ICC may partially fill this gap by adopting the ICTY 
case law, namely, to consider the outcome of a flagrantly 
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disproportionate attack to infer that it was actually a direct attack against 
civilian objects and civilians.259  
Additionally, some major challenges are beyond the purely legal 
realm. These challenges are related to the ICC prosecutor’s access to 
evidence, selection of a mode of liability to suit the evidence gathered, 
and use of prosecutorial discretion to open an investigation and bring 
charges. The prosecutorial decision should be taken based on legal and 
not political considerations to avoid the aura of suspicion that has 
accompanied the decision not to investigate into the NATO campaign 
during the Kosovo war in 1999. In the end, at international criminal 
tribunals, the lack of political obstruction from states and, ideally, the 
existence of state cooperation are key elements that allow investigation 
into and prosecution of events that constitute war crimes of unlawful 
attacks.          
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